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The post-crisis labour market and the challenges to 
policymakers 
 
 
Julia Darby & Stuart G. McIntyre, University of Strathclyde 
 
 
 
Introduction & Overview 
 
 
While headline figures on employment, the participation rate and the unemployment rate for the UK are 
encouraging, there is widespread agreement that the evolving changes in the labour market underlying 
these figures are more complex. One consequence is that headline labour market figures are less useful 
than they were previously for measuring the overall health of the labour market, not just in Scotland, but 
across the UK and many other countries. 
 
It is unclear at this stage whether many of the changes that have occurred will turn out to be temporary, 
and so can be expected to revert back to pre-crisis behaviour and norms as the recovery progresses, or 
whether the severity of the Great Recession has caused persistent changes in the functioning of the 
labour market.  This is important, not least since persistent structural changes may mean that policies 
that worked well in the past may no longer be appropriate. 
 
In this article we begin with a discussion of some key features of the post-crisis labour market. We then 
review a number of the challenges that the post-crisis labour market poses for policymakers, starting 
with how changes in the labour market impact on fiscal balances. We then emphasise that the UK 
Monetary Policy CommitteH¶s assessment of the remaining slack in the labour market is critical to their 
decision as to how long monetary policy can be supportive of the recovery, without risking raising 
inflation above its target. 
 
We argue that it is critical to gain an understanding of the extent and nature of underemployment in the 
economy when making assessments of current labour market slack
1
. This understanding is also critical 
to motivating well designed policy interventions to deliver better labour market outcomes for those 
currently underemployed. We review a number of specific policy prescriptions, drawing on the existing 
literature, as well as on UK and Scottish government experiences. We argue that appropriate policy 
design is now of critical importance to reducing the risks of polarization of the labour market and secular 
stagnation. 
 
Recovery is progressing but evidence of a post-crisis hangover remains 
 
 
The most recent release of UK GDP data indicates that the 2008 peak in real GDP was finally surpassed 
during 2013 and the latest GDP growth figures are more buoyant, particularly when compared to those 
in much of the rest of Europe.   For some time now employment figures have been stronger than 
forecasts  of  the  Office  of  Budget  Responsibility  (OBR)  and  the  Bank  of  England.  The  path  of 
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The Scottish Parliament¶s Economy, Energy and Tourism Committee published a report on ³8QGHUemployment in 
Scotland´LQ April 2013 . This report discusses the definition of the term, evidence on its prevalence, costs to 
individuals and the economy as a whole and sets out a number of policy options. 
  
 
 
 
 
employment since 2010 has been markedly stronger than in previous recessions, although underlying 
the aggregate employment figures, the composition of employment is markedly different in the post- 
crisis period and productivity and earnings have remained weaker than expected during the recovery. 
Much of the increase in total jobs has been concentrated in self-employment, part-time and temporary 
employment. Alongside this a small decline in numbers in full time employment is still evident relative to 
2008. 
 
 
These compositional changes are important. Self-employment has accounted for over one third of the 
rise in employment since 2010, and figures released by the Office of National Statistics ONS in August 
2014  show  an  increase  of  732,000  since  2008:Q1  which  accounts  for  67%  of  the  rise  in  total 
employment over the same period, see ONS (2014). This rise, in part, reflects a long-term trend, though 
the increase has been stronger than forecast. Prior to the crisis the construction industry was the most 
common sector for the self-employed, with around 40% of construction workers classified as self- 
employed. However the crisis hit this sector the hardest, and between 2009 and 2014 it had seen the 
slowest growth in self-employment compared with other major industry groups. ONS figures show that 
the recent rise in self-employment was largest in professional, scientific and technical activities which 
include   roles   such   as   management   consultant,   book-keepers,   photographers   and   chartered 
accountants. 
 
Reliable information on income from self-employment is only available with a long lag as early survey 
based  estimates  are  replaced  with  data  from  self-assessed  tax  returns,  but  available  information 
confirms that earnings of many of the new self-employed lie at the lower end of the income distribution. 
The  Family  Resource  Survey  indicates  that  in  2012/13  the  average  median  income  from  self- 
employment was £207 per week, a fall of 22% (after taking into account inflation) since 2008/09
1
 
 
compared with a fall of around 6% for employees over the same period.  It¶s likely that the aggregate 
figure includes some workers who became self-employed in response to temporarily low demand for 
labour and are working fewer hours than they desire. Some policy makers assume affected workers will 
prefer to switch back into employment as demand recovers. 
 
Another feature of the post-crisis labour market is underemployment. In broad terms underemployed 
include those working fewer hours than they would like or working in jobs that underutilise their skills; i.e. 
part-time workers that would prefer to be full-time and skilled workers currently in low paid, low skill jobs. 
Underemployment is distinct from unemployment in that the individuals are in work but are not working 
at their full capability. A benefit of underemployment, relative to unemployment, is that workers remain 
attached to the labour market. It is widely accepted that underemployment has contributed to the 
resilience of employment through the recession.  However, it also seems likely that underemployment is 
one factor that can help to explain the weakness of productivity in the face of rising employment, the so 
called productivity puzzle, which is evident both in terms of low output per worker and low output per 
hour, see for example Barnett et al. (2014). In our view, restoring productivity to pre-crisis trends is likely 
to require substantial outflows from underemployment into employment to better match desired hours 
and better utilise workers skills. 
 
It is particularly difficult to judge to what extent, and how quickly, underemployment of will dissipate. 
Janet Yellen, Chair of the Federal Reserve, touched on these issues and the challenges they pose to 
  
 
 
 
 
those responsible for US monetary policy in her speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City¶V
Economic Symposium at Jackson Hole in August, Yellen (2014). UK policymakers face similar 
challenges, as we now explain. 
 
The implications of labour market developments for UK macroeconomic policy 
 
 
Policymakers have to make difficult judgments about the extent to which labour market developments 
such as those described above are cyclical and can be expected to revert to better understood norms as 
the recovery progresses, and the extent to which they are structural and can be expected to persist. 
 
Arguments that increases in participation, in part-time employment and in self-employment are likely to 
be temporary and will reverse as recovery progresses include suggestions that increased participation 
largely reflects firms¶ and households¶ Uesponses to temporary impacts of the financial crisis. For 
example, increased participation of older workers can reflect postponement of retirement in response to 
reduced real asset values and lower income from savings.  At the same time, additional entrants into the 
labour force may be working to compensate for losses in household incomes associated with poorer 
outcomes for primary earners who have faced cuts in their hours and/or earnings. As asset values 
recover and primary earners return to their more usual hours of work, this form of participation may fall 
back, and could potentially do so quite quickly. It¶s also possible that as the recovery progresses a lot of 
part-time workers should be able to get full-time jobs, although as Yellen points out, the ongoing shift in 
employment away from goods production and towards services, a sector which typically uses a greater 
portion of part-time workers, may well boost the share of part-time jobs in the longer term. 
 
From the fiscal policy perspective one key question is how much of the government¶s budget deficit can 
be expected to narrow automatically as the economy recovers, and how quickly?  Labour market 
developments clearly matter here, given the importance of income tax and national insurance 
contributions paid by workers in total government receipts and the direct links between labour market 
developments and welfare payments, including those to the working poor. 
 
Reduced hours of work and earnings of primary earners have certainly reduced income tax receipts and 
the shortfall generated has not been offset by increased employment given that the new jobs have been 
disproportionately concentrated in low paid, part-time work. As the OBR have pointed out, this kind of 
employment-driven growth generates less in tax receipts because a given amount of labour income split 
between more people attracts a larger number of tax-free personal allowances, reducing the effective 
tax rate, see OBR (2014).  In this sense both the level and composition of labour income have become 
less favourable for public finances 
2
. Indeed, this could well become more acute if there are further 
 
increases in the value of tax free allowances as some (political parties) propose. 
 
 
Successive OBR forecasts have assumed that recovery will broadly generate a return to pre-crisis 
norms, with relatively modest revisions made to potential output. When outturns have disappointed, their 
successive forecasts have broadly rolled forward the expected recovery and have made relatively 
modest revisions to potential output.  It would be more informative if forecast ranges were provided, and 
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These issues have been discussed at length in recent weeks, see for example Cadman (2014), Houlder (2014) and 
Barrett and Giles (2014). 
  
 
 
 
 
if implications of alternative speeds of recovery and alternative trajectories for potential output were 
discussed. For now, the OBR¶s central forecasts do not appear to have taken on board the rather 
different characteristics of the most recent changes in the composition of employment, leaving them 
overoptimistic on income tax receipts and surprised by the continuing weakness in overall earnings 
growth.  Nonetheless, in its own recently published analysis of their forecast errors the OBR concludes 
that the biggest factors explaining the persistent errors in forecasts of income tax revenues have been 
weak earnings growth reflecting low productivity, along with lower dividend and interest income, OBR 
(2014). At the very least it would be helpful to see the implications of alternative scenarios discussed ± 
admitting the possibility that the labour market may not recover to pre-crisis norms. 
 
 
In order for tax receipts to recover the OBR stress that the gap between actual and potential output 
needs to close and productivity needs to recover. It admits that considerable uncertainty remains in 
relation to how much productivity will recover as demand conditions improve and how much the shortfall 
in tax receipts reflects structural weakness that will not come back. Alongside errors in forecast income 
tax revenues it has been a challenge to for the OBR to accurately forecast welfare payments.  The main 
sources of errors that they¶ve identified relate to housing benefits, tax credits, state pensions and job 
seekers allowance. The main theme being that in the post-crisis period a greater number of the working 
poor have been entitled to claim benefits and tax credits than before. Again, it is clear that a return to 
pre-crisis norms will only follow increases in productivity and wages. 
 
A second key question repeatedly asked of fiscal policymakers is can and should UK wide fiscal policy 
do more to support the recovery? 
 
 
A prominent policy of the UK Government has been to increase in the personal income tax allowance, at 
the same time as reducing expenditure across non-protected departments, and this is planned to 
continue. More specifically, the personal allowance has been increased in successive budgets by more 
than inflation, from £6,475 in 2010-11 to £10,000 by 2014-15 and will rise further on current plans, to 
£10,500 in 2015-16. There are some positive impacts of this policy: it takes some additional families on 
low incomes out of paying income tax and alongside welfare reforms further strengthens work incentives 
especially for some low earners. However, this is a policy that all tax payers benefit from, and while this 
may make it popular with voters in general, more targeted policies may be more effective in helping 
those with the lowest incomes/earnings. Those with the lowest incomes dRQ¶t benefit at all directly and 
are in fact could be worse off if the Government¶s approach to funding tax giveaway involves reductions 
in welfare payments and public service provision. Other policy levers are available to the UK 
Government. 
 
 
Commentators including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UK¶s Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(IFS) have pointed out that there are a number of other potential interventions that would have been 
better targeted at strengthening the labour market. The IMF has gone further in setting out a list of ³job- 
friendly´ policies in their latest Fiscal Monitor, IMF (2014a), top among them are suggestions for targeted 
cuts in employer social security contributions (NICs), increased focus on growth enhancing public 
services; improving access to finance and training; safeguarding social needs by protecting social 
expenditure; and improving infrastructure, especially in the areas of transport, energy, and housing. The 
  
 
 
 
 
IMF explains that this can be done at relatively low financing cost at present, with costs quickly offset by 
both short and long-term benefits. In conclusion, the IMF argue that the composition of fiscal policy can 
and should do more to support the recovery. 
 
 
From the perspective of monetary policymakers the challenge is to understand the implications of labour 
market developments for inflation
3
.  In the current low inflation environment key questions are: i) what 
degree of slack remains in the economy and ii) how far can monetary policy help to reduce this slack 
without boosting inflation above its target? 
 
 
UK monetary policy has maintained a highly accommodative stance since the crisis. Continuing this 
stance has helped to offset some of the adverse impact of reductions in government spending and is 
likely to continue to do so, provided that inflation is expected to remain below target. 
 
 
At present, and on balance, the majority of the Bank of England¶s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), as 
well as external commentators including the IMF, believe monetary policy should continue to support the 
recovery as it has to date. Crucial to their assessment is evidence from the range of indicators that the 
Bank of England uses to assess how much spare capacity or ³economic slack´ remains. As noted at the 
outset, headline figures on the unemployment rate, employment growth and participation rates are 
currently less informative then they were in the past, and this has been recognised by the MPC when 
making judgements. In this regard it is perhaps surprising that the Bank of England referred to a specific 
employment rate when forward guidance was introduced, as did the Federal Open Market Committee in 
the United States. Nevertheless, the Bank has recognised the importance of indicators of 
underemployment and (still muted) wage growth in its policy decision making. 
 
 
Of course, policy decisions are sometimes based on finely balanced judgements. Members of the MPC 
are acutely aware that changes in monetary policy can only be expected to operate with a lag. On the 
one hand it is desirable that the MPC anticipate labour market pressures by raising the Bank Rate in 
advance of any inflationary response, on the other hand if the Bank Rate is increased too far ahead of 
any prospective pickup in wage growth and/or other emerging inflationary pressures there is a risk of 
increasing the vulnerability of highly indebted households. 
 
 
Minutes of the September 2014 meeting of the MPC (the most recent available at the time of writing) 
indicate that they are some signs that labour market slack is diminishing, see Bank of England (2014b). 
In particular job-to-job flows and voluntary resignations, which fell markedly during the crisis, are 
beginning to rise again. This shift seems indicative of improving confidence, and may in part reflect 
individuals finding work in roles that better match their skills and desired working hours. Likewise the 
minutes record growing evidence that some individuals who became self-employed in response to 
temporarily depressed demand for labour may be switching back into employment. The MPC expect 
these developments to reduce underemployment, while boosting measured productivity and earnings, 
while having only a modest impact on wage settlements and unit labour costs. 
 
 
 
3 
Note that we focus here on policy within the remit of the UK¶s Monetary Policy Committee and don¶t, for reasons of 
space, include discussion of related policy in relation to financial stability objectives. 
  
 
 
 
 
Nonetheless, considerable uncertainty remains as to the extent of these ongoing developments, and 
how quickly they will take effect. The views of two MPC members are that it is possible that the 
dislocation that has held back wage growth and productivity is now being corrected quite rapidly. The 
most sceptical on whether underemployment will in fact translate into increased labour supply as 
recovery progresses is external MPC member Martin Weale, see Weale (2014a,b,c). He¶s pointed out 
that people whose partners lose jobs or face a significant drop in their earnings may well say that they 
would like to work longer, but that once the economy recovers and their partners¶ earnings are restored 
the implied extent of the increase in desired labour supply may not materialise. He has set out his 
doubts on the validity of inferences from survey information on underemployment and has concluded 
that, at best, a very substantial margin of uncertainty remains. Weale's own view is that 
underemployment statistics overstate the underlying amount of spare capacity and he has cautioned 
that the stated intention of raising Bank Rate gradually implies that the first rise needs to come sooner 
than would otherwise be the case. At present, his view that Bank Rate should rise soon is not shared by 
the majority of the MPC, who still see muted inflation pressures from wage growth over the next year to 
18 months and it looks unlikely that they all share the view that Martin Weale expressed in a speech in 
October 2014 that the ³best indicatoU´ of future wage pressures wage pressures ³is the rate at which 
unemployment is falling´ Weale (2014c). It is therefore clear that changes in the labour market are 
central to the time path and strength of monetary policy decisions in the UK at present. 
 
 
Quality of jobs and zero-hours contracts 
 
 
Another area of concern for policymakers lies in the quality of jobs being created; this is partly reflected 
in the nature of contracts. A great deal of recent attention has focused on the growing prevalence of so- 
called zero-hours contracts, described as a type of contract used by employers whereby workers have 
no guaranteed hours and agree to be potentially available for work (see for example Pyper and 
McGuinness (2014), Chandler(2014) and Freeman (2014). 
 
Awareness of the use of such contracts has been heightened in the post-crisis labour market. While it¶V
fair to say that there are severe limitations to the available data in this area, the ONS undertook the first 
survey of businesses to obtain an employer-based estimate of the number of employee contracts that 
did not guarantee a minimum number of hours, but which provided work in the survey reference period 
in January 2014 (covering the fortnight beginning 20 January 2014). A second such survey took place in 
September 2014 and results will be reported at the end of the year. This supplements employee based 
information collected through the Labour Force Survey. 
 
For employers, zero-hours contracts offer a means of flexibility to respond to uncertain and fluctuating 
demand. Flexibility is also welcomed by some kinds of workers, for example students and some 
pensioners
4
. However, for workers who would prefer more secure work, but aren¶t able to find other 
openings, contracts with no guaranteed hours are a key source of financial insecurity and are not likely 
to be conducive to career development and progression.  Welfare benefits available to the working poor 
can ease the strain somewhat, but dRQ¶t actively help workers who are unhappy with their hours. Zero- 
 
 
4 
Students need to fit paid work around their other commitments, so having the ability to turn down work around exam 
times etc. is important. Pensioners who are seeking a little extra income may be able to live with the uncertainty of not 
having guaranteed hours. 
  
 
 
 
 
hours contracts can create significant financial insecurity for employees, uncertainty around entitlements 
to benefits and the new auto-enrolment system for workplace contributions, high workplace stress, and 
lack of opportunities for career progression. As the recovery strengthens, some workers may be able to 
renegotiate their contracts or find permanent jobs, but zero-hours contracts are likely to remain a feature 
of the labour market. 
 
Several consultations on the use of zero-hours contracts have reported during the past year.  Vince 
Cable, Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills, led on the UK Government consultation 
which ran from December 2013 until March 2014, and reported in June 2014. The main outcome was 
the announcement of the Government¶s intention to ban the use of exclusivity clauses which seek to 
prevent individuals on zero-hours contracts from working for another employer, even when no work is 
guaranteed. The use of such clauses undermines choice and flexibility for the individuals concerned, 
and seeks to prevent them from finding alternative ways to increase their earnings. The proposal to ban 
exclusivity clauses is now a provision in the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill, currently 
being considered by the UK Parliament. 
 
An additional issue, and where there is currently some confusion, is whether those people who are 
currently unemployed and refuse a zero-hours contract will face benefit sanctions. Although Vince Cable 
has tried to give reassurances in this regard, Minister for Employment Ester McVey has not ruled out 
imposing sanctions on those failing to accept a zero-hours contract, without good reason, under the new 
system of Universal Credit, see Pyper and McGuinness (2014). 
 
In April 2014 the Labour party published its own consultation in Pickavance (2014). This made a number 
of recommendations in addition to banning exclusivity clauses: i) that employers should be prevented 
from requiring zero-hours workers to be available for work; ii) that zero-hours workers who in practice 
work regular hours should, after a specified period, have a right to a contract with fixed minimum hours; 
and iii) that zero-hours workers should have a right to compensation when shifts are cancelled at short 
notice. 
 
Policy changes have also been proposed in Scotland, and may well have an impact relatively soon. 
While employment policy is a reserved power of the UK Government, the Scottish Government is 
seeking to influence the types of employment contract that firms tendering for Government work use via 
its procurement procedures
5
. New Scottish legislation is expected to be in place towards the end of 
 
2015. 
 
 
So far we have concentrated on the actual versus desired hours dimension of underemployment, but 
two further dimensions are also important and potentially have even greater implications for the future 
productive potential of the economy and for the persistence or elimination of sub-optimal outcomes. 
These dimensions relate to geography and skills. 
 
Geographical and skills dimensions to underemployment 
 
 
The geographical dimension of underemployment is sometimes referred to as geographical mismatch 
and stems from the fact that jobs are often located where poorer people cannot afford to live.  The skills 
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See the Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, which was passed by the Parliament on 13th May 2014 and 
received Royal Assent on 17th June 2014. 
  
 
 
 
 
dimension of underemployment refers to workers who are in jobs that doQ¶t fully utilise their skills or 
qualifications.  One  of  the  clearest  examples  of  the  skills  dimension  of  underemployment  is  the 
prevalence of a proportion of recent graduates working in non-graduate jobs
6
. 
 
The policy prescriptions that have be advanced to reduce geographical underemployment include i) area 
based policies aimed at incentivising companies to locate/expand in areas of high unemployment and ii) 
helping workers move to, or commute to, areas with lots of jobs. There are many examples of past 
policies that fall into the first category including Regional Selective Assistance, Enterprise Zones, 
European Union Structural Funds, and industrial cluster policies. However, for a range of reasons, 
evaluations of such policies tend to conclude that they have not generated the hoped for outcomes, see 
for example Lawless et al. (2011) and Neumark and Simpson (2014). 
 
The objective of helping workers move to areas with lots of jobs has motivated policy prescriptions of 
liberalising planning laws, removing zoning restrictions and incentivising provision of cheaper housing, 
all of which can be expected to have impact albeit with varying time lags. The objective of helping 
workers to commute to areas with job vacancies recognises that a lack of affordable and efficient public 
transport can constitute a barrier that makes it harder for people to access appropriate work. Some 
powerful recent evidence comes from a US study of job search among nearly 250,000 Americans in nine 
cities in the Midwest who lost their jobs during mass lay-offs at the start of the crisis. 
 
Their engagement with the labour market was tracked over a six year period and findings suggest that 
the typical American city dweller can access just 30% of available jobs in their city within 90 minutes 
using public transport, see Andersson et al. (2014). Spending money on transport infrastructure to 
improve job accessibility is consistent with the IMF¶s call for a well-designed fiscal stimulus discussed 
earlier. Indeed, in England, the economic case put forward for HS2, and now HS3, stresses the intention 
to create a network of cities that are more accessible to workers by cutting journey times.   However 
there¶s been vocal debate on how large the potential employment effects of such initiatives really are, 
with critics focusing on the need to help those in areas of social deprivation outside cities to access 
available jobs, rather than improved city to city links, see for example Overman (2012). 
 
Initiatives to improve the accessibility of low skilled workers to existing vacancies need not involve 
massive infrastructure investment of the scale of HS2 or HS3. In fact, researchers looking at the US data 
have suggested that the amount of money involved could be relatively small: simply buying buses and 
having them pick up workers in lower-income, outer neighbourhoods and then running them from those 
places ² not stopping along the way ² all the way into commercial centres can greatly increase the 
accessibility of jobs to low-income workers, see Andersson et al. (2014). We believe that serious 
consideration should be given by UK and devolved policy makers to an assessment of geographic 
mismatch and what steps can be taken to improve accessibility of vacancies, particularly for low skilled 
workers. 
 
Returning now to skills mismatch, much of the focus of policy has been on improving education to work 
transitions. For example, a number of specific policies were recommended by the Commission for 
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Considerable media attention focused on an ONS report from November 2013 which found that 47 per cent of those 
who completed a degree in the past five years were working in non-graduate jobs (predominantly in roles such as 
sales assistants and care workers) in April to June 2013 as compared to 39 per cent in 2008, see Office of National 
Statistics (2013). 
  
 
 
 
 
Developing Scotland¶s Young Workforce, chaired by Sir Ian Wood which reported in June 2014, Scottish 
Government (2014). The recommendations can be broadly described as encouraging a closer 
relationship between schools and industry; a better tailoring of college level education to the needs of 
employers; improvements in the modern apprentice scheme and work to encourage employers to hire 
young people. While undoubtedly important, policy needs to recognise that those currently in education 
and transitioning into the labour market represent only one dimension to the skill match issue. As we 
have emphasised above, seeking to increase outflows from underemployment is critical if the workers 
are to achieve their potential and if the economy¶s growth potential is to be restored. 
 
In some ways the challenge faced by policy makers here is similar to that posed by youth unemployment 
and long-term unemployment. So discussion of interventions that seek to improve incentives for firms to 
take on younger workers, for example by targeting a reduction in non-wage labour costs via a reduction 
in employers¶ national insurance contributions; taking actions that improve SME¶s access to graduate 
labour markets and to better match those firms with vacancies to access a suitably qualified pool of 
applicants are all relevant. Reports prepared for the Department of Business Innovation and Skills and 
by the Small Business Federation have made important contributions here, see Sear et al. (2012) and 
Federation  of  Small  Businesses  (2009).  The  focus  particularly  on  small  businesses  is  warranted 
because a considerable proportion of the new jobs created during both the recession and the on-going 
recovery  are  in  successful small  businesses  that  are  innovative  and  are  drivers  of  growth  in  the 
economy as a whole, see Department for Business Innovation and Skills (2013). 
 
However, in this article we have emphasised that it is important to have a clear focus on improving 
labour market outcomes for as many as possible of those currently in a situation of underemployment. If 
policymakers, commentators and agencies such as Job Centres are too focused on headline 
employment, participation rates and unemployment rates there is a real danger that poor outcomes will 
persist. Ironically, where in-work benefits and tax credits make underemployment more bearable this 
may erode incentives for workers to keep looking for better employment matches during recovery and 
may result in them staying underemployed for longer. In the absence of other interventions, there should 
be real concern that polarization within the labour market will persist and recovery in fiscal balances will 
be delayed. In our view, failure to take policy action to tackle underemployment in all its guises is a 
recipe for greater polarization in the labour market and a continuation of productivity growth that does 
not fulfil its potential. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
In conclusion, after previous recessions policymakers focused on getting people back into work and 
avoiding lasting negative impacts from long-term unemployment. This time, the fact that a higher 
proportion of the working age population has retained engagement with the labour market has been a 
positive achievement. Nevertheless, as we argued that there is a need to upgrade the nature of some of 
this engagement as the recovery progresses in order to address underemployment and the persistence 
of associated bad outcomes for individuals, for fiscal balances and for the productive potential of the 
economy as a whole. 
 
In particular some workers are in jobs that don¶t fully utilise their skills; have limited prospects for 
advancement and/or their jobs fail to provide the hours of employment desired. These workers, and 
  
 
 
 
 
others,  may  face  barriers  in  accessing  available  vacancies  that  better  suit  their  abilities  and 
requirements as a result of geographical mismatch. We have argued that there is a clear need for 
policies that facilitate transitions out of poorly matched jobs to reducing the risk of sustained polarization 
of labour market outcomes and underperformance of the economy as a whole. 
 
In our view the most promising policies to improve the strength of the labour market include policies to i) 
improve  transport  infrastructure,  helping  people  commute  to  access  suitable  jobs;  ii)  help  people 
relocate to access jobs; iii) help SMEs with vacancies to achieve better matches of workers to jobs; and 
iv) remove exclusivity clauses in zero hours contracts and for the Government to show leadership in 
incentivising improved contractual arrangements via its own procurement rules. While it is feasible for 
zero-hours contracts to play an important role in a well-functioning labour market, it is clear that the 
growth in these contracts in recent years does not reflect a robust and well-functioning labour market ± 
and indeed may undermine the strength of the economy as we continue to emerge from the Great 
Recession. 
 
The success or failure of policies to improve labour market outcomes will have profound implications for 
both  fiscal  and  monetary policy.  For  the  reasons  outlined  earlier,  there  are  important  interactions 
between welfare policy and the feasibility of attaining sustainable fiscal balances in the future. If 
unchecked, the persistence of each of the elements of underemployment we have highlighted will 
contribute to stagnation of median incomes and be reflected in persistently lower tax receipts and higher 
spending on in-work benefits. And importantly, from the monetary policy perspective, the prospects for 
wage pressure from these groups is likely to remain muted until significant inroads are made into 
eroding remaining labour market slack in the economy and returning hourly productivity back toward pre- 
crisis norms. 
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